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ABSTRACT
How do conflict myths mobilize actors in insurgencies? This thesis aims to answer this
question by exploring how insurgent leaders engage in revolutionary mythmaking in its
messaging to combatants, members of the nation, and the international community, in order to
incite and sustain their rebellions. I compare the Zapatista Army of National Liberation of the
1994 Zapatista rebellion and the Kosovo Liberation Army of the 1998 Kosovo war in order to
examine the kinds of myths propagated in each case. This study argues that revolutionary
mythmaking is not a mere feature of some insurgencies but a necessary condition for an
insurgency to occur. The forces compelling fighters to take up arms, nationals to support the
cause, and the international community to take interest are myths of folklore, homeland, and
heroes. Unlike previous single-case studies, this thesis offers a comparative perspective that
reveals commonalities in the kinds of myths propagated in insurgencies.
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INTRODUCTION
War requires belief. For rational beings to risk life and limb in conflict, particularly in
insurgencies and revolutions, they must believe in the righteousness and feasibility of their
campaign. Conflict studies must pay urgent attention to the myths to which armies subscribe;
these are the initial stirrings of uprising, and these sustain soldiers and supporters. In this thesis, I
will examine the intersection between two distinct insurgencies and their similar deployment of
myth.
In 1911, Mexican revolutionary Emiliano Zapata rallied the peasant class of southern
Mexico around a radical land reform proposal. Although the 1917 Constitution of Mexico
included agrarian reform measures, they never reached the scale Zapata hoped for, nor were they
ever fully implemented in the southern regions for which he fought. In 1994, an insurgent
commander in the Lacandon jungle held up a gun to the light and said, “This is a weapon of
peace” (Conant 2010, 25). The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) declared war
against the Mexican state on New Year’s Day, 1994, to protest the relegation of the indigenous
to second-class status and to advocate for regional autonomy. Their leader, Subcomandante
Marcos, produced reams of writing full of historical and religious mythic significance on behalf
of the insurgency.
Across the world, in 1912, the Serbian kingdom regained control of the province of
Kosovo, and neighboring Albania hastily formed its own state to stave off further territorial
losses; this left a Kosovar population divided between ethnic Serb and ethnic Albanian, with
each group claiming the same small homeland as its own. Over time, ethnic-Albanian leaders
built a parallel state in the face of increasing Serbian oppression; the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) began to form against this backdrop. A Homeland Calling fund opened in Zurich in 1993
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to raise funds for the liberation of Albanian Kosovo. In the run-up to 1998, a sense of duty, a
high unemployment rate, and motivating national myths led young men to join the KLA ranks.
When the army held forty percent of Kosovo territory by May, resources began to pour in from
the Albanian diaspora: money, weapons, recruits, and international legitimacy.

Research Question
This project explores the role of myth in mobilizing conflict, particularly insurgencies
against a dominant power. The study examines the types of myth insurgencies create or revive,
and how they use these myths to mobilize various groups for particular aims. Specifically, I
question how myths are used to rally or recruit combatants, sway the nation or nationals to the
side of the insurgency, and influence the international community to confer support, legitimacy,
or aid. I use two historical cases, the 1994 Zapatista rebellion in Mexico and the 1998 Kosovo
war, to begin answering these questions.
In both cases, distinct ethnic, religious, and cultural identities were at play in the making
of the insurgencies. How do these differing identities determine the kinds of myths created? Both
conflicts saw scores of ordinary people make life-altering sacrifices in support of the war, but
what made regular people fight and die for an unlikely rebellion? Both insurgencies had
centuries of regional folklore from which to draw inspiration, but what myths survive and sustain
troops in battle, a nation in crisis, or global observers?
These questions about revolutionary mythmaking matter now as countries in the early
2020s continue to gear up for renewed great power competition and the national security field
has begun the Pivot away from terrorism toward China and Russia issues. Though the U.S.
national security community has long focused on the political, economic, and military factors
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shaping conflict, it has focused less analysis on the salience of founding myths and revolutionary
mythoi. Despite my focus on insurgency, conflict myths matter to the most topical national
security issue of today; Russia has attempted to justify its invasion of Ukraine as a reclamation of
a mythical “Rus” homeland. Meanwhile, Ukraine has elevated its citizens into fighters to fend
off the foreign invaders, calling upon the Ukrainian diaspora to return and fight the imperialists,
outfitting each group with mythic significance tying back to Ukraine’s history and notions of
independent nationhood. To fully understand today’s conflicts, we must deepen our study of
conflict myths in general.
To investigate revolutionary mythmaking, this research study turns to two very different
struggles from the 1990s, a period in which neoliberal globalization and liberal democracy were
taking victory laps as apparent agents of permanent world change. At the same time, backyard
wars and ethnic conflicts erupted as the bipolar international model fell apart. These historical
cases provide insight into the importance of mythmaking to insurgencies. The Zapatista rebellion
and the Kosovo conflict were clashes of competing nationalisms, homeland myths and
countermyths, and new notions about the formation of polity that radicalized some actors and
threatened others.
Today’s national security analysts have missed a key indicator of uprising and
destabilization: competition of equally strong, equally compelling national myths. Political
events in Western countries—the storming of the U.S. Capitol by far-right conspiracy theorists,
the wildfire success of formerly fringe-element nationalist parties in European elections, and the
increasing antipathy of left-wing youth to the capitalist nation-state—have demonstrated that
more and more disillusioned citizens are willing to eschew the values that unite the nation.
People are believing other myths, imagining new polities.
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Argument
Without the explicit propagation of nationalist myths, the moment of insurgency for the
Zapatista rebellion and the Kosovo conflict could not have occurred. Although other factors
influenced the preparation and execution of the insurgencies, the forces compelling fighters to
take up arms, nationals to support the cause, and the international community to take note were
these myths of homeland, religion, and heroes. In the Zapatista case, Subcomandante Marcos and
his indigenous council relied on the myths of eternal return, animist notions of homeland, and of
the noble savage in order to stage their uprising. The Kosovo Liberation Army included in its
messaging, rites, and rituals the myths of martyrs, local folklore, and revenge to secure fighters
and supporters, as well as Western backing. Insurgencies cannot fight without money and guns,
but the inherently slim odds of success require a revolutionary mythos that can inspire
ideological and material investment.

Methodology
This comparative history will examine the internal and external messaging employed by
the EZLN and the KLA during the run-up and course of the respective conflicts. This thesis will
primarily examine the ten-year period between 1989 and 1999, with relevant evidence drawn up
to six centuries prior in order to establish the durability of particular myths and grievances.

The Zapatistas
My primary sources consisted of Subcomandante Marcos’s communiques, addresses to
the nation, and conversations with journalists. In addition, I analyzed interviews with and
addresses by other Zapatista fighters and functionaries. From over 100 of Marcos’s

9
communiques, I discarded those that did not meet at least one of the following criteria: discussed
events before or during 1994, followed recurring figures such as Old Antonio, discussed the
formation and planning for the insurgency, or revealed insight into the general Zapatista
worldview. I excluded post-1994 communiques, Marcos’s discourses on U.S. and world affairs,
and many of his fables, which, though fascinating, are irrelevant to this study. These sources
were analyzed and categorized by theme: historical figures, religion and animism, struggle
against oppression, indigeneity, connection to homeland, and inclusivity. I included specific
secondary sources based on their inclusion of these themes. For secondary sources, Jeff Conant’s
work on The Poetics of Resistance illuminated the role of poetry and symbolism in the Zapatista
public relations campaign. In the sections for messaging to the nation and to the international
community, The Zapatista Reader edited by Congressman Tom Hayden provided contemporary
accounts from Mexican observers and opinion-makers.

The KLA
I encountered limitations in collecting data on the KLA due to a lack of English-language
material and general secrecy surrounding KLA internal operations while International Criminal
Court proceedings against KLA operatives are ongoing. However, KLA programs and
statements given by KLA combatants, both foot soldiers and leaders such as former President
Hacim Thaci, provide insight into the workings of the KLA and how it motivated combatants. I
also analyzed Albanian folklore for connections to the contemporary conflict. The analysis
identified consistent themes of martyrdom, familial honor, revenge, victimization, struggle
against oppression, and homeland. For secondary sources, interviews with war correspondents
and other journalists were invaluable in filling information gaps, as well as academic accounts by

10
scholars with firsthand access to KLA leaders. These included the journalistic works of Janine di
Giovanni and PBS Frontline correspondence, as well as the academic works of James Pettifer
and Henry Perritt, among others.

Case selection
The Zapatista and Kosovo cases were chosen to connect important similarities between
vastly different insurgencies that occurred with a narrow time frame and were both successful to
some degree. I returned to the 1990s for historical cases for a number of reasons: a postmodern
time period seemingly marked by the end of history and death of meaning, during which people
sought their own; the explosion of ethnic and nationalist conflict despite the supposedly unifying
forces of globalization and neoliberalism; and the relative recentness of the conflicts. The
inclusion of a case from Eastern Europe and a case from Latin America offer geographically
distinct examples of insurgencies. The Zapatistas and the KLA come from very different political
histories and ethnic, religious, and cultural identities, which their revolutionary mythoi reflect. I
intended to learn what these revolutionary mythoi consisted of and if, despite their differences,
there were commonalities in the way mythoi mobilized the insurgencies’ success.
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This project rests on several critical bodies of history and research. This literature review
provides brief histories of the Chiapas and Kosovo conflicts; an overview of scholarly work on
myth as it specifically relates to notions of time, history, and truth; and an overview on theories
of nationalism. Drawing from these works, I define myth as a story or theme to which believers
have ascribed symbolic importance and a quality of truth, no matter its place in reality.

History of Zapatista Conflict
Although the 1917 Constitution of Mexico included agrarian reform measures in Article
27, the ejido system to expropriate commercial estates for collective cultivation never fully came
to fruition in the southern regions that needed it (Schools for Chiapas).
In 1982, Mexico defaulted on its $80 billion foreign debt, resulting from a reduction in
global oil prices that hit the oil-producing regions of Mexico particularly hard, notably the
southern state of Chiapas, during la decada perdida, the lost decade of economic turmoil (Sims
and Romero 2013). In response, the International Monetary Fund approved a $4 billion
emergency loan, attaching conditions that required Mexico to eliminate its budget deficits and
undertake structural economic reforms (Sims and Romero 2013). Accordingly, then-President
Miguel de la Madrid implemented austerity measures and neoliberal policies that invited foreign
investment and privatized national industries (Lacey 2012). Mexico joined the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1986, further ensuring economic decentralization
throughout the 1980s. In 1988, Carlos Salinas won the presidency, promising in vain to aid
poverty-stricken states like Chiapas, where guerrilleros had formed small armed militia groups
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during the lost decade. One of these, founded in 1983 by indigenous campesinos and sympathetic
urban northerners, called itself the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) (Schools for
Chiapas).
In 1991, the Mexican Salinas government revoked Article 27 of the Mexico Constitution,
leaving indigenous ejidos and landholdings open to sale and privatization, confirming natives’
fears (Galvez 2018, 210). American, Mexican, and Canadian trade representatives submitted the
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for ratification in their respective capitols in
December 1992. In 1993, the EZLN designated a political leader, Subcomandante Marcos, and
made clandestine plans to rebel against the Mexican state (Schools for Chiapas). On January 1,
1994, the morning NAFTA came into effect, the EZLN publicly declared war on the Mexican
government. Approximately 3,000 armed Zapatista insurgents seized towns across Chiapas,
freeing prisoners and holding city halls hostage, initiating an uprising against neoliberalism that
held national and international attention long past the official January 12 ceasefire (Medhurst
2017).

History of Kosovo Conflict
The Serbian empire lost control of Kosovo for the first time when the Ottoman Empire
wrested control of the territory in the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje. Serbs believe Prince Lazar
Hrebeljanović was made to choose between an earthly kingdom—Serbia—or a heavenly one
(Kaser 1998). While the battle gave birth to the Serbian national myth and solidified Serbs’
perception of themselves as the chosen people, the Serbian loss introduced Ottoman Muslim
influence and inhabitants from modern-day Albania (di Giovanni 2003). Over the centuries, the
territory gradually became more Muslim than Christian, more Albanian than Serb. The
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demographic unbalance in Kosovo deepened Serbian resentment until the Serbian kingdom
regained control in 1912.
In 1912, Albania hastily formed its own state to stave off further territorial losses to
Serbia and Greece (di Giovanni 2003). Before, the Ottoman Empire had forbidden the teaching
of the Albanian language in schools and disunified Albania by drawing borders without regard to
ethnicity. As Albania became more cognizant of its own identity and national interests, the
ideology of Albanian irredentism, or the creation of a “greater Albania,” took shape and grew
strength (Fischer 2011). The Serbian kingdom had regained Kosovo, but the new Albanian state
held reunification with the majority-Albanian province in its long-term goals. Kosovo changed
hands during World War II, briefly annexed by Italy in support of Albanian irredentism, but was
folded into the Yugoslav Federation along with Serbia at war’s end in 1946 (British Broadcasting
Corporation 2012). The Kosovar Serb population began to control state institutions such as
security services and the Communist Party, brutally repressing the ideology of Albanian
irredentism and causing many Albanians to flee. (The children and grandchildren of this wave of
the Albanian diaspora would eventually be among those to return to fight with the KLA.) After
Serbia granted Kosovo limited autonomy in the 1960s, power shifted again—ethnic Albanians
now held the majority of government jobs and the Albanian flag flew freely over the province
(Petrović & Stefanović 2010). Yugoslav President Tito sharpened ethnic divides, which were
occasionally devolving into violence, by redrawing the Yugoslavia Constitution in 1974, which
gave Kosovo unprecedented autonomy and self-governance privileges.
Tito died in 1980, and with him the era of “Brotherhood and Unity” (di Giovanni 2003).
In 1981, ethnic Albanians rioted for a better standard of living while Kosovar Serbs blamed both
Belgrade and Albanian-dominated law enforcement for their second-class status (Howe 1982).
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Meanwhile, Tito’s death had given rise to Slobodan Milošević. During a landmark speech at
Kosovo Polje, Milošević cried to a crowd of Kosovar Serbs, “No one shall ever dare beat you
again!” (Milošević, 1987). The crowd reportedly shouted back, “We love you Slobodan because
you hate Muslims.” He rode the wave of Serbian nationalism to the Yugoslav presidency. In
1990, the Serbian parliament voted to dissolve the Kosovo government, succeeding in revoking
Kosovo’s autonomy and resulting in the firing of ethnic-Albanian workers (Mulaj 2008). In
1991, ethnic Albanians elected pro-independence pacifist Ibrahim Rugova to lead Kosovo, but
not everyone believed nonviolence was the path forward. Quietly, in the background of Serbian
oppression, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began to form.

Myth and Conflict
Joseph Campbell defines myth as metaphors of “spiritual potentiality,” and identifies two
types: a kind that relates a person to one’s nature and the natural world, and another that is
“strictly sociological” that relates a person to one’s in-group or community (Campbell 1991, 28).
A form of sociological myth are national and conflict myths, and these are the subject of this
project.
Mircea Eliade, in his work on the myth of the eternal return, offers another definition,
restricting myth to “imitation of an archetypal model” (Eliade 1949, xiv). Eliade distinguishes
between the “profane,” that which does not have an archetypal precedent and is not
mythologized; and the “real,” or those causes, events, and people that take the shape of a
celebrated or odious past. This distinction invokes historical verisimilitude: the notion that there
is a difference between reality, or factual accounts, and the truth, or the mythologized version.
For an account to become truth, according to Tzvetan Todorov, it must be “‘receivable by

15
contemporaries’” (Conant 2010, 57). Put another way, Ronald Wright defines myth as “‘an
arrangement of the past, real or imagined, in patterns that reinforce a culture’s deepest values’”
(Conant 2010, 54). Myths help cultures “navigate through time” through mythistory. Robert
Moss uses the term mythistory to “describe a true story of something that may or may not have
happened but always is” (Moss 2009, 14). According to Eliade and Victoria Bricker, in archaic
societies with oral traditions, history is divorced from linear time and “blends with myth and
legend in a way that differ[s] fundamentally from the established Western view of time as an
objective sequence of events that actually happened” (Conant 2010, 54). Studying mythistory,
we can understand time as a cycle in which what is true matters more than what occurred.
Why does myth matter for conflict studies? Political and economic factors tip the balance
in favor of conflict (weakness of the ruling party or high male youth unemployment) but myths
turn discontented civilians into fighters and casualties into martyrs. The Zapatistas did not invent
the noble savage, nor the KLA a martyrdom complex, but competent leadership can aggregate
myths, rites, symbols, and themes to create a mythos in order to convert the range of emotions
generated by pre-conflict conditions into support for their insurgency. Karl Kaser’s work
demonstrates that leaders can create mythoi by co-opting or manipulating existing national myths
in moments of perceived crisis or opportunity. As stated, myths exist in a liminal space,
“evok[ing] a time out of time” or “a notion of time suspended” or repeated (Kaser 1998, 96).
“Competing oral traditions” lead to conflict in this liminal space as communities fight for
cultural dominance. Myths never exist in a neutral space, for notions of “moral and military
superiority and inferiority are always implicit and usually explicit” (Kaser 1998, 97). They are
reinforced through repetition, cementing the dichotomy of us versus “the other.” Repeated
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“mythological remembrance reshapes the sometimes meager historical reality,” Eliade’s profane
history, “and creates new, elevated reality,” our mythistory (Kaser 1998, 97).

Nationalism
Umut Özkirimli offers a far-reaching critical overview in his Theories of Nationalism,
including primordialism, modernism, and, most central to this thesis, ethnosymbolism. He first
cites Ernest Renan’s poetic definition of a nation, “that all individuals have many things in
common, and also that they have forgotten many things.” Renan rejects objective
characteristics—race, language, religion, geography, the like—as the defining forces of a nation;
these do not create the solidarity that is the nation (Renan 2018). This solidarity is sustained
through story and involves remembrance of the past’s heroic triumphs and “collective
forgetting,” or even revision, of the historical events that would divide them (Renan 2018, 251).
Theories of primordialism all subscribe to the antiquity or inevitability of nations as units
of organization. Nationalist primordialism contends that a sense of national belonging overrides
all other belongings, and “comes with a host of temporal and spatial claims—to a unique history
and destiny and a historic ‘homeland’” (Özkirimli 2020, 51). Özkirimli identifies five recurring,
sequential themes throughout nationalist primordialism literature: the nation’s antiquity, its
golden age, the “superiority of the national culture,” benighted periods from which the nation is
destined for deliverance, and finally the arrival of the national hero who uplifts the nation
(Özkirimli 2020, 52). Sociobiological primordialism associates common ethnic descent with this
process; this theory defines nationalism as when “a sense of belonging to an ethnie is
transformed into a demand for political autonomy or independence” (Özkirimli 2020, 55).
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On the other hand, modernist theories of nationalism reject the existence of nations in
antiquity and identify them as modern inventions (Özkirimli 2020, 72). Nairn’s economic
transformation, Hobsbawm’s political transformation, and Anderson’s sociocultural
transformation theories provide diverging explanations for this claim. Nairn calls nationalism a
cost of “the uneven development of history” since the 18th century; societies use nationalism to
progress economically (seeking industrialization and wealth) by “regress[ing] culturally
(drawing more deeply upon their indigenous resources, resurrecting past folk heroes and myths
about themselves)” (Nairn 1975, 18). However, Hobsbawm credits the process of inventing
historical traditions, using “history as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion,” for
nationalism; he agrees that national belonging comes with more obligations than other kinds
(Hobsbawm 1983, 12). However, contrary to this thesis, Hobsbawm declared that nationalism
would no longer be a critical force of historical development in the late 20th century; “time and
again,” he wrote, nationalist movements in the 1980s and 1990s “seem to be reactions of
weakness and fear, attempts to erect barricades to keep at bay the forces of the modern world”
(Hobsbawm 1992, 170). Finally, Benedict Anderson credits sociocultural transformations,
specifically the decline of the religious and dynastic realms, for giving rise to nations and
nationalisms (Özkirimli 2020, 108). In the twilight of religious dominance, people had to
reimagine—through creation, not falsification—their communities, destinies, and sense of
historical time (Anderson 2006, 12). In the end of colonial empire, three institutions drove the
creation of new imagined communities: the census, “representing the nature of its people;” the
map, outlining the homeland; and the museum, which recorded and legitimized the nation’s
stories and forebears (Anderson 2006, 164).
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Critiquing modernism, and most applicable to this study, is the ethnosymbolist theory of
nationalism, led by scholars Anthony D. Smith and John Armstrong, which emphasizes the “role
of myths, symbols, memories, values, and traditions” in the development of nationalisms
(Özkirimli 2010, 143). Ethnosymbolism relies on a long span of study, reaching into antiquity to
find the importance of ethnies in forming modern states. Armstrong argues that inability to
communicate with other groups creates the initial recognition of a distinct ethnic belonging
(Armstrong 1982). Ethnies, once formed in pre-modernity, are persistent and resilient, having
formed national identities through time and “memories of golden ages, myths of origin and
ethnic election, cults of heroes and ancestors,” and the claim to a homeland (Özkirimli 2020,
143).
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CHAPTER TWO: ZAPATISTA ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
Introduction
To mobilize actors to fight, donate resources, and provide international legitimacy, the
Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) leveraged the myths of eternal return, homeland
as spiritual provider, and the noble savage in a sophisticated public relations campaign. Like its
revolutionary namesake, Emiliano Zapata, the Zapatista movement found success by building a
mythos around its leader’s celebrity. The mythos driving the movement included elements of
Mesoamerican indigenous animism, Mexican national political folklore, and Western notions of
the preserved, noble savage. The animist principle that the land and its people are intimately
interconnected like mother and child appears often in the Zapatista literature and reasoning.
Outside that framework, the figure of Subcomandante Marcos as the second coming of Emiliano
Zapata appeals to the Mexican patriot and pride. Internationally, the Zapatistas capitalized on the
outsider’s perspective invoking the myth of the noble savage, an out-of-time indigenous
population fighting the admirable fight against neoliberalism and for the old, premodern ways.
These three levels of myth each appealed to a specific kind of supporter: recruit, national, and
foreigner.
Popular insurgencies rely on members’ belief in the movement’s potential to succeed or
even to occur. Before the passionate speeches declaring imminent success comes convincing the
community they have the capacity to rebel at all. The Zapatistas brought the idea of a war against
the Mexican state first into the community’s truth, then into its reality. Despite facing poverty
and precarity, Chiapaneco respondents to a 1992 survey ranked “war” as a greater impending
threat than “poverty,” “disease,” “deforestation,” or “pollution” (Arizpe, Paz, and Velazquez
1993). A domestic worker in the state capitol “suddenly quit her job,” despite having “just used
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her entire Christmas bonus to buy hundreds of bandages” (Collier 2008, 1). When an interviewer
asked, “You saved your own money to buy [weapons]?” EZLN fighter Ana Maria confirmed that
they acquired arms “with the sacrifices of the people” (Schools for Chiapas 1994, 5). The
fighters and supporters poured their personal resources into the effort because they were
convinced of the movement’s feasibility. Through the mythos I will describe, the EZLN
leadership made it feasible to summon the revolutionary success of Emiliano Zapata. Their
mythos pronounced it possible to relive the movement, adapted for the modern day.
The EZLN enacted this mythos through the two-pronged approach Subcomandante
Marcos called “the word” and “the fire,” or through the Zapatista literature and through deeds.
Determining the efficacy of the Zapatista mythos involves analysis of Subcomandante Marcos’s
communiques. These were delivered aloud at public gatherings, published in Mexican daily
newspapers, and spread throughout the international Left, and were the principal ideological
recruitment mechanism of the movement. Of the “jokes, fables, masks, dolls, songs, radio
broadcasts, videos, posters, popular theater, poems, and murals” that promoted Zapatismo,
Marcos’s communiques offer the roadmap to understanding the mythos (Conant 2010, 15).
Taken together, “this brilliantly enacted pageant caught the hearts and imaginations of Mexican
civil society and activists around the world” (Solnit 2016, 42).
In a move seen repeated throughout the insurgencies of the 1990s, the first action of the
Zapatista rebellion took place on December 31, 1993: the EZLN occupation of a radio station
(Conant 2010, 26). The station takeover demonstrated the awareness that the principal strength
of the rebellion would be its messaging. Without the advantage of military power, insurgent
movements must take control of discourse to recruit and persuade. State or hegemonic regimes
wage “war against imagination” and against alternative realities; “it follows, then, that the
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counteroffensive should take the form of poetry” and myth (Conant 2010, 32). Through
promoting a mythos, insurgencies can take “the power to articulate one’s self, one’s community,
one’s history” in the metaphorical “territory of struggle” (Conant 2010, 27). Both the Mexican
state and the EZLN propagate a mythos, but the insurgency created a more successful set of
stories and symbols with the complexity to shift as they “gain[ed] or los[t] moral ground and
popular support or disapproval” (Conant 2010, 58).

Messaging to Combatants
Activist poet John Ross wrote, “The altos and jungles of Chiapas have never lacked for
prophets the way they have lacked for land and bread and liberty” (Ross 1995, 8). The Zapatistas
protested publicly, held forums and dialogues, and distributed literature in order to recruit and
rally the army. To gain land, they focused on territory; their messaging strategy relied on
Mesoamerican animism, framing the denied homeland as the spiritual provider in order to revive
memories of conquest and subjugation. Among other demands, the rebellion’s quest to control
the land on which Chiapanecos worked, rather than face exploitation by wealthy landowners,
was underscored by the animist belief that all natural objects and creatures possess a spiritual
presence. Marcos mastered looping lofty political goals and religious notions back down to
Earth. In the Yucatan oral tradition, the storyteller often intercedes toward the end of the tale to
bring myth and reality together, to make the abstract tangible, and so listeners recognize their
role in the story’s purpose (Conant 2010, 75). Marcos’s communiques reflect this tradition and
create the mythistory in which his combatants feel belonging. His stories gave them a
mythologized history to claim as their own, no matter the grim historical reality.

22
Cyclical time and mythical history
The January 1 rebellion continued a long tradition of indigenous, “divinely-inspired”
uprising in Chiapas (Ross 1995, 64). The first line of the EZLN’s first address to the world—
“We are the product of 500 years of struggle”—has a dual meaning: Mexico’s struggle for
independence against its colonial handlers, and the struggle of Mexico’s indigenous against the
Mexican state for the same crimes. The non-indigenous onlooker understands the 500 years as a
linear series of events, but the campesino-turned-EZLN combatant knows differently; time and
rebellion, in the Mesoamerican tradition, are cyclical (Benjamin 2000, 423). Informed by the
traditional society’s concept of time—a cyclical process, rather than a linear one—helped to
radicalize Chiapas. Mexican writer and advocate Carlos Montemayor wrote that this alternative
notion of time helped explain “the cultural resistance and combative capacity” of the rebels; for
them, “the past is found in another dimension that continues coexisting with the present
(Montemayor 2004, 115). The Mesoamerican tradition explicitly notes that the timelines of myth
and history blur and converge (Benjamin 2000, 421). This convergence should not be confused
with nostalgia or delusion; for the Chiapanecan indigenous, this “timelessness of myth” in
conjunction with historical tradition is “woven into the rationality with which that community
has to confront the world of the state and the market” (Gilly 1998, 325).

Homeland as spiritual provider
Therefore, the denial of homeland brought on by Article 27’s revocation in 1992
corresponds with the theft of homeland Zapata fought against and the plunder of homeland
during the Spanish Conquest; not only historically, but with the previous catastrophe’s emotional
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fervor returning, strengthened. The antiquity of the land suggests the longevity of the movement.
In Marcos’s telling:
“But when there is a moment of rest, which there are still, they hear another voice, not that which
comes from above, but that which is carried by the wind from below and which is born in the
indigenous heart of the mountains, that speaks of justice and liberty…”

In this section, Marcos illustrates how animist spirits, such as the wind, help to deliver the
word of rebellion. The mountains, the homeland, itself lights the spark of dissent.
“And the oldest among the old in the community tell of a man named Zapata who rose up for his
people, and his voice more than shouted, it sang, “Land and Liberty!” And these ancient men tell
that Zapata never died, that he will return.”

Here, Marcos clearly indicates the myth of eternal return attached to the celebrity and
leadership of Zapata. Marcos mythologizes Zapata as more than a man and makes him immortal;
at the same time, he implies that Chiapas will once again return to a time of such leadership, and
Zapata’s spirit will return in another cycle of rebellion.
“And the oldest of the old people tell that the wind and the rain and the sun tell the campesinos
when he must prepare the earth, when to plant and when to harvest. And they tell that hope is
planted and harvested also. And the old people tell that the wind, the rain and the sun are
speaking in their own way to the earth, that after so much poverty they cannot continue
harvesting death, that it is time to harvest rebellion.”

The land is a living player, and readers come away feeling “that Mother Earth is seeking
her revenge for centuries of abuse and crimes against” not only the land itself but the people who
work it and call it home (Conant 2010, 70). Marcos’s writing declares that the avenging, hopeful,
rebellious spirit of their earth “will be embodied by the EZLN” (Conant 2010, 71).
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Messaging to Nationality
The Mexican state builds broad consensus through the mestizo Mexico myth, or
promoting the idea of a racially homogeneous nation united in its blended indigenous and
European origins. In marginalizing the country’s ethnic diversity and its indigenous community,
the mestizo Mexico myth aims to prevent conflicting identity-based interests from entering the
national discourse. The Zapatista movement is a contrary response to this myth.

Zapata and Mexican history

Preempting the government’s attempt to paint the insurgents as foreign agitators, the
Zapatistas established their movement as simultaneously borne of Mexican history, a struggle
belonging to all Mexicans, despite being unequivocally indigenous and apart from most
Mexicans’ historical experience. The Zapatistas also needed to educate the Mexican citizenry
about the injustices faced by the indigenous population, without undercutting their campaign to
promote a shared identity. In a ceremony initiating Marcos, Comandante Tacho first presented
the Subcomandante with the Mexican flag: “We are Mexicans who want to be free. This is the
flag of our history” (Conant 2010, 24). Zapatismo borrowed key motifs from Mexican history in
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building its mythos, selected to awaken patriotic collective memories in the mainstream Mexican
consciousness. “The image of Marcos immediately invoked…that of Emiliano Zapata on
horseback,” establishing Marcos as an archetypal Mexican “good revolutionary,” a memory all
but obliterated by neoliberalism (Rajchenberg and Heau-Lambert 1998, 19). Casting Marcos as
Zapata also served to legitimize their demands, showing that the EZLN’s aims were “nothing
unheard of or extreme,” simply the same rights guaranteed to all Mexicans by the Constitution
(Conant 2010, 103). A popular Zapatista slogan promoted their fight for inclusion and not special
treatment: el grito, “Nunca más un México sin nosotros!” “Never again a Mexico without us!”
Ironically, the Mexican government itself proved the success of this rhetorical link to
Mexico’s past: Mexico removed Zapata’s likeness from its currency later in 1994 (Conant 2010,
102). The EZLN’s propagandists held Zapata up side-by-side with the gods of Mayan antiquity,
creating a syncretic national homeland myth to revise and replace a national history that had left
out the indigenous.

Everyman hero

The EZLN’s winning command of symbolism did not end with flags and bandoliers. The
Zapatistas embodied the everyman hero myth through the symbolism of their ski masks. The ski
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masks served the practical purposes of obscuring identities of actors engaged in illegal action and
protecting faces from the January cold, but they were also a rhetorical weapon in the EZLN
arsenal. The Zapatista movement imbued a ubiquitous object with revolutionary meaning;
“suddenly, guerilla war is declared every time a ski mask appears in public in Mexico” (Conant
2010, 120). Although he joked his mask shielded him from unwanted romantic advances, Marcos
hid his face to make tangible a Zapatista tenet: everyone can be Marcos. The uniform
emphasized the sameness of the Zapatista fighters and lent them all the symbolic power Marcos
commanded. Furthermore, anyone could show their support by donning a ski mask or wearing
the symbol, a low-effort way of joining the movement. Marcos’s insistence on inclusivity, while
also furthering the EZLN ideological goal of creating “a world where many worlds fit,”
compounded “the illusion of seeing a historical deed live” (Paz 1994, 30). Although critics
labeled them superficial stunts, “staged and with makeup,” the Zapatistas created a political
theater many Mexicans wanted to watch and join, its mythos having awakened profound national
memories.

Messaging to International Community
Despite its policy goals, the Zapatista rebellion was not destined to become the cause
célèbre of international opponents of neoliberalism. Many on the international Left believed that
“Indians, like ‘backward’ peasants everywhere, had to be transformed into a subgroup of an
urban industrial proletariat” (Hayden 2002, 4). On the issue of indigenous communities in all the
Americas, “the Left was sorry for these Indians, but rarely in solidarity with them” (Hayden
2002, 4). The architects of the Zapatista movement, aware of this, used it to their advantage.
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The noble savage
The EZLN, amplified by international media, revived the problematic myth of the noble
savage to sway international opponents of neoliberalism to provide resources, raise awareness,
and confer worldwide legitimacy and political capital. Zapatista leadership intentionally
undersold the movement at times, casting themselves as simple people with simple demands,
using ski masks and wooden guns as props. In its messaging, the EZLN presented an intentional
caricature of Indian identity; in the communiques, the recurring figure of Old Antonio typifies
the noble savage, an oversimplified character dispensing nuanced advice. Old Antonio helps
Marcos, a ladino, to develop an indigenous conscience. Throughout the Zapatista mythology,
Marcos emphasizes dignity as one of the EZLN’s chief intangible demands. The communiques
“tell stories about dignity so that we, as foreigners, can begin to grasp what it means” (Conant
2010, 99). The Indian emerges from his mysterious place in the Lacandon jungle into the light to
teach benighted modernity a lesson in living well.
This old trope, despite reinforcing notions of the Indians’ otherness, did ignite interest
among the international Left in the Zapatista case. Chiapas provided the perfect destination for
an activist vacation; the uprising drew prominent left-wing writers and cultural critics who wrote
passionately in defense of the insurgents. “By using folktales, myths, [and] jokes,” the Zapatistas
fulfilled “a psycho-emotional need for stories of resistance in the international left” (Conant
2010, 40). The communiques “invite[d] the heady sympathy of the intellectual class” through
Marcos’s extensive allusion to the left-wing literary canon (Conant 2010, 67). The strategy was
another of Marcos’s balancing acts—layering in-group intellectual references over indigenous
earnestness—that served to charm international onlookers into becoming Zapatista supporters.
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Conclusion
The Zapatista movement inspired thousands of combatants to fight and even die for the
cause, and many thousands more to lend their support materially and ideologically. Even though
it would fail to achieve its policy goals of land redistribution and improved conditions and
autonomy in Chiapas, the two-week rebellion, with its long odds and wooden guns, cornered the
Mexican government into official peace negotiations and toppled the Institutional Revolutionary
Party’s seventy-year political dynasty.
These results, and the January 1, 1994, moment of insurgency itself, would not have
occurred without the EZLN’s purposeful development and deployment of a revolutionary
mythos. Zapatista leaders drew from the spiritual connection between the people and their
homeland to mobilize combatants, existing national myths of Zapata and national heroism to
mobilize the nation, and the notion of the noble savage to mobilize the international community.
This combination ignited the insurgency.
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CHAPTER 3: KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY
Introduction
If the Zapatistas modeled insurgent propaganda through word, the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) mastered it through deed. The Zapatistas used weapons to advance a war of
political ideals; the KLA used ideals to advance a war for national sovereignty. However, both
insurgencies employed a mythos startingly similar in structure and sometimes even style. The
most famous section of Gjergj Fishta’s The Highland Lute, the Albanian nationalist epic poem
that inspired KLA leaders, echoes the Zapatista’s first declaration to the world:
We are the product of 500 years of struggle.

Five hundred years are now behind us,
Since Albania the fair was taken…

The KLA also propagated a series of myths and symbols to recruit the fighter, radicalize
the national, and win the support of the international community. Myths of martyrdom, an
Albanian kacak rebel tradition, and revenge mobilized the local fighter. KLA leadership
pressured Albanian and Kosovar nationals to lend their physical and monetary support through
themes of exile resentment and diaspora guilt. Finally, the KLA gained international, particularly
U.S., support by leveraging images of a vengeful Serbia and victimized KLA, and by framing
themselves as heirs to the anti-colonialist Western freedom fighter tradition.
Studies of the KLA have to contend with “the closed inner workings of a banned
underground military organization that was often dominated by myth and misinformation” even
within itself (Pettifer 2012, 3). Few English translations exist of rank-and-file KLA soldier
memoirs, and many KLA leaders still face international war crimes charges that prevent fuller
accounts of the war from emerging. However, to uncover and clarify this mythos, I drew from
dozens of journalist interviews with former KLA combatants and leaders, ex-KLA memoirs

30
when available in English, KLA public statements, and detailed academic accounts of KLA
planning and strategy in order to identify common themes.

Messaging to Combatants
Martyrdom
“The Kosova Albanian campaigns of the twentieth century were built on martyrs”
(Pettifer 2012, 15). Martyrdom remained the dominant myth leaders used to mobilize fighters in
this Kosovo war. The death of Adem Jashari, one of the KLA’s founders, most famously
catalyzed the insurgency. Active from the beginning of the Kosovo independence movement’s
militarization, Jashari and his brothers evaded Serbian arrest and execution for decades until his
family’s compound was surrounded, shelled for days, and destroyed in March 1998, leaving
more than fifty dead, including children and other noncombatants. Rather than crippling the
revolutionary cause, the spectacle of his death would move many others to action. The Jashari
massacre gave local perceptions of the KLA “a sense of reality, credibility, and substance” to
those who had doubted its existence (Duclos 2020, 27). Doubters now saw the linkages between
the mythistorical resistance movements of the past and this new armed resistance, where before
the KLA could be dismissed as incapable or irrelevant. It is important to distinguish that, instead
of the typical Serb extrajudicial dissident execution, “Jashari died in battle, supposedly
sacrificing himself and his family for the nation” (Duclos 2020, 27). Jashari fulfilled the
Albanian resistance tradition of not allowing oneself to be taken alive in battle, also depicted in
The Highland Lute: “‘And you’ve never seen an Albanian / Blow himself up and you with him,’
/ And then he set fire to the powder” (Fishta 1923, 45). Furthermore, “the conditions in which
Adem Jashari died encouraged the construction of a myth of resistance situated in a national
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heroic genealogy,” stretching back to Gjergj Kastrioti Skanderbeg, the medieval martyr who led
Albanian resistance against the Ottoman Turks (Duclos 2020, 27). Skanderbeg was already
immortalized in Albanian oral tradition and epic, but now communities would ask folk singers,
“‘Play us a song about Adem Jashari,’” and they would; “thus the music and its dreams spread
through the people” (Beqaj quoted in Perritt 2008, 21).

The KLA incorporated symbols of Jashari and Skanderbeg into its initiation rites; some
fighters “took their oath to join the KLA in the Skanderbeg grave enclosure” (Pettifer 2012, 99),
and new recruits at the Tirana KLA headquarters turned in their passports beneath a poster of
Jashari with the words “HOMELAND IS CALLING” (di Giovanni 2003, 14). Finally, the
Jashari funeral offered "an opportunity for popular mobilization and political participation that
even the most tyrannical regimes find they cannot easily control,” bringing the KLA into the
open in the controlled environment of public mourning, allowing the Kosovar Albanian people to
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see and touch these men in uniform (Pettifer 2012, 114). Beginning with Jashari, the KLA would
go on to “refer to almost every KLA casualty” as “martyrs” (Perritt 2008, 34).

Everyman hero
The KLA created fighters that would become these martyrs through the myth of the
everyman hero, how the KLA instilled each fighter with the confidence that their death in battle
could have as much meaning as Jashari’s, no matter their position or skill. The loyalty oath,
taken kneeling before the Albanian flag, declared “I will always be ready…to sacrifice even my
life for the sacred interests of the Homeland” (Pettifer 2012, 64). One fighter felt “immortal for
my country” (Perritt 2008, 38). Young fighters who would become casualties were made to feel
“courageous and heroic, regardless of how effective they were” (Bukoshi quoted in Perritt 2008,
65).
The proliferation of personal weapons provided a tangible symbol of a fighter’s
connection to the cause. “For the Albanian, the rifle was and is an ‘extension of the vertebral
column’” (Pettifer 2012, 13). A fighter quipped to a journalist, “Everyone from Kosovo knows
how to use a gun” (di Giovanni 2003, 17). “Obtaining a weapon” in Albanian society “is a way
of asserting oneself by rejecting a posture of victimhood,” and has been since the Ottoman Turk
policy of disarming Kosovar Albanians to quell political dissent (Duclos 2020, 30). The mythical
symbolism of the gun also stems from the Kanun, the honor code and Albanian supplement to
Sharia law that governed patriarchal clan and family relations. In more recent history, ownership
of a handgun provided “an index of the relationship between Serb and Albanian in Kosova,
symbolized by the money spent by Albanians on elaborately enameled and silver-embossed
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guns” (Pettifer 2012, 13). The KLA fighter could transform himself from a farmer or a server or
a high school student into a resistance hero of Albanian folktale by acquiring a firearm.
The KLA’s horizontal structure also reinforced the everyman hero narrative; resistance
networks were “heavily fragmented into groups based primarily on acquaintances between
families, colleagues, and neighbors” (Duclos 2020, 25). A high school recruit, Adnan, said:
“There were no forms to fill out to join the network…You joined if you were ready, and if
someone on the inside had invited you” (Duclos 2020, 25). Another fighter, named Fehmi,
added, “I don’t know who our leader was, but each Thursday we would meet, give a report on
the week’s work, and plan the coming week…our work was propaganda” (Duclos 2020, 25).
Without a formalized hierarchy, fighters did not develop top-and-bottom rung attitudes.

Kacak rebel tradition
The kacak movement dominated Kosovar Albanian resistance from the late nineteenth
century into the first decades of the twentieth: these bandits choked off supply lines, set up
checkpoints, and antagonized Serbian forces as part of a larger failed uprising. Facing long odds
themselves, the KLA drew inspiration from this “past of a rebellious comfort, the knowledge that
however futile and unproductive their revolt, it was ‘good’ because it fell into the tradition of
their predecessors, the war of a lonely man on a cold night with a handgun by the roadside”
(Pettifer 2012, 20). KLA commanders mimicked the style of these earlier rebels: many “grew
beards and flourished mustaches and sported a variety of local symbolic objects” (Pettifer 2012,
107). KLA strategy also largely avoided formal armed conflict, focusing on establishing
checkpoints and watchtowers and conducting guerilla attacks (Bartetzko 2018). In this way,
KLA declarations of Kosovo’s liberation “were a genuine symbolic coup,” intended to stir
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national pride rather than describe facts on the ground (Duclos 2020, 26). Much like the kacaks,
whose name derives from the Turkish for bandit or outlaw, the KLA was maligned with illicit
accusations. However, “‘banditry’ to the Ottomans or to the Serbs was, of course, ‘resistance to
oppression’ to the Albanians” (Perritt 2008, 39). Attempts to link the KLA with narcotrafficking
only hardened local support among families whose primary interest was defending their homes
and way of life. “As Hobsbawm has pointed out, the bandit flourishes in a society based on a
peasantry” (Pettifer 2012, 19); subsistence farming and little to no accumulation of money
persisted in the Kosovar Albanian countryside well into the late twentieth century. Resentful of
the towns and cities drawing tribute and wealth from the rural areas, “local ‘Robin Hood’
traditions were ‘richly immortalized in [Kosovo] song and folklore,” and the KLA banditry
strategy took inspiration from these myths fighters grew up hearing, especially in the Drenica
region (Pettifer 2012, 20). Additionally, the homeland itself took on a dual strategic and mythical
quality. The mountains and forests of Drenica “had provided cover to earlier rebellions, notably
the kacak uprising,” and the region was harder to pacify, with its caves, winding roads, and
hiding places (Boyes and Jagger 2017, 6). The mountains supported the rebels strategically and
spiritually as well: “for Albanians, ‘the mountains are a refuge of liberty, democracy, and the
peasant republic’” (Pettifer 2012, 16).

Revenge
Closely linked to the myths surrounding martyrdom and the kacak tradition is the notion of
revenge and retribution, which appears frequently in fighters’ explanations for joining the army.
Families whose father figures had been killed, imprisoned, beaten, or fired by Serbian forces
throughout the twentieth century held “militant capital” that encouraged them to send their sons
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to fight back (Duclos 2020, 32). This militant capital, generated by a tradition of resistance to
Serb oppression, collected in families and manifested as a desire for revenge.

When guerilla attacks began against police targets, potential recruits understood that “to
kill a policeman was to draw blood in the revenge process, an attractive opportunity to regain
honor under the dictates of the Kanun code” (Pettifer 2012, 87). Many families approved of their
sons’ quest for revenge and honor and expressed pride (Kirk 2000). Journalists noted that some
recruits “did not volunteer to serve, they were forced, either morally or by their families, to fight
with the KLA” (di Giovanni 2003, 21). Post-war, when a PBS interviewer asked, “Do you think
all this was worth it?” a former fighter responded:
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“We didn’t choose the war, we didn’t want to die, but it was the only option left. Time goes by,
we couldn’t afford to lose this last chance. We paid a triple price. We paid for the generation
before, for us and for the generations to come…It was a difficult, unfair war, but it is worth it to
die for freedom (Kirk 2000).

The mythic weight of the “triple price” led many Albanians to believe that “only
rebellion and insurgency warfare were an adequate response to their repression,” other methods
having failed before (Pettifer 2012, 12). Resistance became an inheritance; in particular, “the
Drenica region saw itself as the Kosova Sparta where every boy was destined for war against
Serb domination” (Pettifer 2012, 12). In these places, family-structured KLA recruitment was as
simple as choosing to identify as belonging to the army, without necessarily receiving any KLA
training or resources. One fighter who joined a clan-based KLA group claimed he “had never
heard of the Jashari family before the war” (Duclos 2020, 26). However, these fighters still
situated their resistance beneath the KLA banner because the KLA’s nationalist mythos matched
the local mythos that motivated them. One did not need the grand national aspirations of KLA
leadership to join the KLA, because the KLA propagandists constructed the national mythos
around the themes of local people. The homeland “was conceived both as a space to be protected
and as a nation to be preserved in the face of coercion,” making space for both motivations of
KLA fighters within its ranks (Duclos 2020, 28).

Messaging to Nationality
KLA leaders had to gain the critical support of the Albanian diaspora in order to procure
more fighters, weapons, and funds. To win its support would require amplifying an Albanian
national mythos that “coexisted with an Albanian defeatism” (Perritt 2008, 20). Failed uprisings
had added to the diaspora’s numbers in the past, but the KLA cultivated the “consciousness of
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potentiality,” or a belief in the capacity to rebel, through the nationalist mythos (Perritt 2008,
27). At times, the messaging to diaspora mirrored the messaging to combatants—Albanian
émigré clubs were named after prominent resistance martyrs by the late 1980s (Pettifer 2012,
52)—but the need to overcome diaspora defeatism led to other themes, preying on exile
resentment and a kind of survivor’s guilt. KLA leaders ramped up exile resentment, the notion
that the diaspora members’ nation had been taken from them (Perritt 2008, 17). Many in the
diaspora had family members that remained in Kosovo, and KLA messaging in the wake of the
Jashari family massacre warned them that “one’s own family would not be safe if the status quo
were allowed to continue” (Perritt 2008, 38). The poetry of Nexhat Imeraj, praising American
KLA volunteers, invoked “souls burning with fire / In a foreign land” and reassured Kosovo that
“heart comes to you / My beloved country” (Pettifer 2012, 79). Western fighters carried out the
myth of the return of the prodigal son, having been lost in a strange and foreign land and now
rightfully returning to claim their birthright nation.
The Albanian diaspora was also influenced by a kind of survivors’ guilt. Upon seeing the
carnage on television or in newspapers, young Albanians’ “youthful, carefree lives” in the West
stopped (Duclos 2020, 28). “I’ve got gas and electricity at home, I’ve got money and a job, but
my conscience wouldn’t let me stay home and watch TV,” a fighter reported (di Giovanni 2003,
17). Kosovar fighters made direct appeals to the diaspora: when asked, “What is your message
for young people everywhere?” a fighter answered, “I would tell young Albanian young people
that when our country needs us we must be there, fighting for its freedom” (Kirk 2000). Diaspora
guilt abroad and the resistance tradition in Kosovo created “moral dilemmas for those who chose
not to fight” (Perritt 2008, 37). A diaspora Albanian recalls a conversation in which his brother
said, “We cannot sit this out. Our family’s honor requires that I fight” (Perritt 2008, 42). After
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reminding his brother of his lack of useful skills for the army, they found other ways to
contribute to the cause. The hugely successful Homeland Calling fund relied on contributions not
only from Albanian businesses and elites, but from small personal pledges derived from people’s
monthly income.

Messaging to International Community
While the Zapatistas engaged the International Left, the KLA had its sights set on US and
EU military and diplomatic intervention. In the beginning, U.S. officials declared their
unwillingness to act as “the air force of the Kosovo Liberation Army” (Dobbs 1999). In 1999,
US-backed NATO planes brought the end of the war through a bombing campaign on Serbian
targets. In between, the KLA leadership reversed the Western perception of itself as a terrorist
organization into one of freedom fighters in a just war against foreign occupation. The KLA
announced its intention from the outset:
“For the sake of peace in the region, we appeal to international decision-makers and, in particular,
the United States and the European Union, to exert pressure upon the [Serbian] occupants and to
give their support to the just war of the Albanian people in Yugoslavia” (KLA General Staff
Program, Pettifer 2012, 278).

Vengeful Serbia, victimized KLA
Not only did the West reverse its position, but “NATO did not feel duped; their action
didn’t just loosen Milošević’s grip, it also gave the alliance a mission” in the post-Cold War era
and after the colossal humanitarian failure in Bosnia (Boyes and Jagger 2017, xiii). Eager not to
repeat past mistakes, NATO was ready to accept the KLA narrative of a vengeful Serbia and
wholly victimized KLA, a band of brothers and sisters fighting simply to defend their homeland.
(In reality, evidence indicates that KLA combatants attacked Serb and Roma civilians (di
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Giovanni 2003, 1). Hashim Thaci, ex-KLA political representative and former President of
Kosovo, is at time of writing detained in the Hague awaiting trial for war crimes.) Proponents of
intervention, ranging from the floor of the US House of Representatives to neighboring Albania,
ascribed an almost holy quality to the KLA’s mission. Former Albanian President Berisha called
Serbian forces “barbarians” and KLA rebels “blessed.” While the KLA purposefully avoided any
religious affiliation, they cast themselves as the next democracy in line to shake off the chains of
tyranny. “Like Churchill,” Thaci “understood that the war would only be won when the
Americans were drawn into the fighting by the pluck and suffering of the victim-nation” (Boyes
and Jagger 2017, xiii). No doubt surrounds Serbian atrocities against Kosovar Albanian civilians.
However, indictments of key KLA leaders for crimes against humanity demonstrate that the
position of the KLA as purely “victim” is another myth.

Anticolonialism
“The KLA belongs and will forever belong to the people. Our country must, and has a historical
obligation to assist those parts of the country that have been occupied. The KLA will accept the
assistance of and will cooperate closely with the international community” (KLA General Staff
Program, Pettifer 2012, 278).

The KLA perpetuated the myth of Serbs as foreign occupiers through messaging
emphasizing the Albanian majority, ignoring the Serbian minority that had lived in Kosovo for
centuries and had once formed the majority. Inadvertently, the Milošević regime’s emphasis on
Serbian-ness in the province aided this perception. By changing place names and creating a
parallel state for the Serb minority, the Serbian government behaved more like a new invader
than the initial kingdom in the land (Perritt 2008, 30). Therefore, the KLA could frame the
conflict as anticolonial, further cementing the view that the conflict would usher in democracy.
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Throughout this chapter, KLA soldiers have emphasized the freedom for which they
fought: freedom for their families, their denied homeland, and from general Serb repression. This
attitude came from top down and bottom up, evidenced by another tenet of the KLA General
Staff Program:
“The KLA struggle has a defensive and liberation character. Its goal from start to finish has not
been war itself, but freedom and peace for the people. It is with this in mind that it will fight and
sacrifice” (Pettifer 2012, 277).

Conclusion
The KLA mobilized its combatants through myths of martyrdom, a historical rebellious
tradition, and revenge. The army mobilized the wider nation and diaspora through myths of exile
resentment, and finally the international community through myths of foreign occupation.
Informed by local legends and Albanian folklore, inspired by old heroes and new martyrs, and
sanctified with Western backing, the confluence of factors leading to the KLA’s success has
been called by some observers to be as rare as “shooting stars” (Perritt 2008, 14).
Every war involves chance and luck, but the KLA’s mythic messaging to the combatants,
the wider nation, and the international community revealed not only its leaders’ forethought, but
local and replicable conditions that allowed myths of homeland and nationalism to take root.
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CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I examined how myths mobilized actors in insurgencies; specifically, the
ways combatants, nationals, and foreigners were influenced by conflict myths and the types of
revolutionary mythoi insurgent leaders constructed. These answers are vital to understanding the
development of insurgencies and provide insight into the foundations of conflict in general. I
argue that the construction and deployment of a revolutionary mythos is a necessary factor in the
execution of an insurgency; myths create the sense of feasibility necessary for an insurgency to
occur, sustain combatants throughout their campaign, and recruit supporters at home and abroad.
The Zapatistas, through the extensive writings of Subcomandante Marcos and the
movement’s physical symbolism, enacted a revolutionary mythos centered around
Mesoamerican animism and the homeland as a spiritual provider, the celebrity of Zapata and
Marcos, and the myth of the noble savage. Four years later, the KLA, through its rites and rituals,
found success in its mythos based on martyrdom and revenge, exile resentment, and foreign
occupation.
Although vast differences exist between the two insurgencies, important commonalities
exist as well in the kinds of myth propagated by leaders to incite and sustain conflict. The first
are the outsized presence of dead heroes, their flaws forgotten and elevated to an almost godly
status, in the form of Zapata and Adem Jashari. These figures, providing strategic guidance in
life, offer spiritual guidance in death. Over time—just days, in Jashari’s case—their symbolic
capital accumulates so as to transform their memory into myth. They exist in liminal space
outside of linear time; this liminality allows insurgent leaders to tap into the multigenerational
emotional investment in the eternal return to the golden age.
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Local folklore also played a role in both insurgencies. The Mayan and Albanian oral
traditions passed down lessons that boosted morale, like the spirits of wind that carried word of
the Zapatista rebellion, and shaped the battlespace, such as the Albanian folktale tenet to not
allow oneself to be taken alive. In both armies, soldiers believed to some extent in the homeland
not only as an object to be won, but a force fighting alongside them. Animist beliefs about the
connection between the land and those who work it motivated the Zapatistas, while KLA fighters
found solace as well as strategic benefit in the rough and mountainous terrain of Drenica.
Finally, the everyman hero myth mobilized both armies through both rhetoric and
symbolism. Combatants in the EZLN and the KLA were mythologized as heroes, and leaders
intentionally kept barriers to the status of hero low. The Zapatistas cultivated the everyman hero
myth through the unifying ski mask, creating a homogeneity in which individuals embodied the
symbolic power of the entire movements. The KLA connected everyman hero myth to
martyrdom, emphasizing the heroism of taking the pledge, ritually or informally, a soldier took
to die for the nation.
Despite distinctions in region, religion, and ethnic identity—factors that may have
precluded accurate comparison of conflict in the past—these similarities demonstrate the
relevance of a mythos in leading a rebel army. Revolutionary mythoi compel ordinary people
turned fighters to die for their homeland.
Contributions of Study
Mythmaking is understudied as a component of conflict, and this project aims to help fill
this gap in scholarship. Furthermore, placing the Zapatista and KLA cases in conversation with
one another offers a comparative perspective single-case studies of myth and symbol in conflict
have lacked. The similarities in revolutionary mythmaking found through this comparative study
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demonstrate the overarching relevance of mythmaking to insurgency at large, not as a mere
feature of individual conflicts but a necessary condition for conflict to occur.
We should expect to observe future insurgencies to cultivate their symbolic resources and
engage in revolutionary mythmaking. Although each rebel group has its unique identity, they
will recycle elements of history and repurpose existing themes that respond to present conditions
of threat, instability, and risk that motivate the early stages of insurgency.
Limitations of Study
Unfortunately, I was unable to travel to Chiapas and to Kosovo in order to conduct
archival research to substantiate my argument and to conduct interviews with leading figures. I
was also limited by my lack of Albanian fluency, which narrowed the pool of primary sources
from which to draw for the Kosovo analysis.
Avenues for Further Research
Further research into myth as a mobilizing force in insurgency should take into account a
wider geographic and temporal range of cases. Future studies might also inquire into the utility
of studying myth in forecasting conflict; a renewed interest in revolutionary historical figures,
local folklore, and other indicators of mythmaking may give an alert for potential uprising.
Revolutionary mythmaking may intersect with media studies—how does the media respond to
and interact with revolutionary mythoi when reporting conflict? Elevating revolutionary
mythmaking in scholarship and national security analysis could lead to a deeper understanding of
conflict in several fields.
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